
























zur Zukunft der Arbeit
Institute for the Study 
of Labor 
Women and Power:
Unwilling, Ineffective, or Held Back?




Women and Power: 




Universitat Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona GSE 
and SP-SP, IESE Business School  
 
Albert Saiz 













P.O. Box 7240   
53072 Bonn   
Germany   
 
Phone: +49-228-3894-0  







Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of IZA. Research published in 
this series may include views on policy, but the institute itself takes no institutional policy positions. 
 
The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center 
and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit 
organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of 
Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and 
conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) 
original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of 
policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public.  
 
IZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. 
Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be 













Women and Power: Unwilling, Ineffective, or Held Back?
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We develop a model that nests previous explanations for women under-representation in 
positions of power. Focusing on democratic electoral dynamics, our framework delineates the 
three types of mechanisms that may be at play: consumer demand, candidate supply, and 
internal party dynamics beyond electoral markets. We use Spain’s Equality Law, requiring a 
40 percent female quota in electoral lists, to test the alternative theories. The law was 
enacted by the social-democratic party after the surprise parliamentary electoral results 
following the Madrid terrorist bombings, and was therefore completely unexpected by 
regional political machines. The law only applied to towns with populations above 5000, so 
we can use a treatment-control, before-and-after discontinuity design to learn about the 
impact of female politicians in local elections. Our evidence is most consistent with the 
existence of entrenched male-dominated political machines capturing influential power 
positions within the parties. 
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Fund. 1 Introduction
Over the world, males are largely over-represented in powerful positions in either the public
or the private arenas. Only 17 percent of the members of the US Congress and Senate,
for instance, are women. Several reasons may explain why women do not reach in￿uential
positions more often. Women may be discriminated against by insiders occupying powerful
positions, which historically have been men. Women may have a preference for alternative
occupations that o￿er a better balance between professional and personal life. Additionally,
in the case of political representation, voters may have preferences for male representatives.
Parties would therefore rationally respond to this bias by ￿elding fewer women candidates.
We argue that it is possible to test among these hypotheses by looking at the e￿ects of
introducing female candidate quotas. When party political machines do not discriminate
against women they choose their candidates to maximize electoral results. We would only
observe fewer women than men if either there are not enough potential female candidates,
or if their voters prefer male politicians. Hence, any constraint imposed by female quotas on
the party’s selection of candidates must result in worse electoral outcomes, either because
not enough talented women are available to ful￿ll the quota, or because voters dislike having
more women. In contrast, when party machines discriminate against women, they nominate
fewer women than would be optimal at the expense of better electoral results. As a result,
female quotas should increase the voting shares of parties that were ￿elding less female
candidates.
We exploit an exogenous change in electoral rules to test the implications of the di￿erent
theories of female under-representation. Spain’s Equality Law o￿ers us an unparalleled
opportunity to learn about these issues. The law was passed in 2007 to promote the equality
between men and women.The passage of the law (an indirect e￿ect of the Madrid terrorist
bombings) had been completely unanticipated by local political machines, candidates, and
voters. It required political parties to ￿eld candidate lists for local elections with a minimum
40 percent of female candidates. 1 However, the quotas only applied to municipalities with
more than 5000 inhabitants. Using a regression discontinuity design, we can control for
factors that di￿ered across municipalities and that changed from one election year to another,
such as voters’ preferences or attitudes towards women. We focus on all electoral lists and
outcomes in both the elections prior to the law (2003) and after (2007).
We ￿nd that the law e￿ectively increased the presence of women in the lists by 8 percent-
age points in the treated municipalities with respect to the counterfactual. This represented
1The election of town councilors in Spain is done using closed lists, where each list must contain a number
of candidates equal to the council seats that are being contended.
2an increase of 25 percent in the number of female candidates. Moreover, the law forced par-
ties to maintain the same minimum of 40 percent of women on every ￿ve-position bracket of
the list. As a result, the number of women on the top 5 positions also increased by a similar
amount.
Voter turnout in the municipalities a￿ected by the law was not reduced as a result of the
larger number of additional women candidates. This was true regardless of the magnitude of
the local change in the share of female candidates, which depended on the average distance
to the 40 percent quota in the pre-treatment elections. The number of null or blank votes,
which could be thought of as protest votes, measuring disapproval of the political system,
was not a￿ected either. These results are not consistent with the existence of major voter
aversion to female candidates.
Moreover, there was signi￿cant heterogeneity in the initial number of women by list
and municipality. A priori, this fact could have been interpreted as signaling the presence
of gender preferences among voters that are correlated with ideology (e.g. conservative
voters in rural areas may have di￿erent tastes). However, we ￿nd that parties that were
￿forced￿ to make larger increases in the number of female candidates improved their electoral
performance relative to the other parties. Thus the evidence is not consistent with the
existence of voter-speci￿c tastes against female candidates. On the contrary, at the margin,
voters seemed to be happier with more balanced lists, suggesting that parties were not
optimizing the gender composition of their lists prior to the law. This is an important result in
the context of the con￿icting existing research of the impact of women on electoral outcomes.
Papers based on voter surveys in the US claim to ￿nd evidence of voter discrimination but
correlational evidence suggests a neutral or positive impact of female politicians on electoral
outcomes (Dolan, 2004, 2005). In this context, we provide evidence of a positive impact of
women politicians using a clean quasi-experimental design that exogenously increased the
number of female candidates in a treatment group of municipalities, but did not in a similar
control group.
We further ￿nd, as the party discrimination theory predicts, that the positive e￿ect of
women on votes was concentrated in municipalities with non-competitive elections, where
one party had enjoyed an absolute majority in the 2003 elections. Consistent with this
￿nding, women had been more severely underrepresented in the ￿safer￿ seats of incumbent
parties in these uncompetitive environments prior to the law.
We also show that parties did not have major problems ￿nding suitable female candidates
to ￿ll in the quotas. The Equality Law was not associated with increased list attrition or
di￿culties for new lists to arise. Parties did not need to retain past female candidates more
often or to promote female ￿￿ller￿ candidates to top positions either. Together with the
3results on electoral outcomes, this evidence is not consistent with the existence of major
supply constraints of high-quality female candidates.
These results do not seem to be driven by women’s lack of a desire to compete for a
position in the list. While women may shy away from competition on average, a large
number of women in competitive lists leveraged the quota to attain higher positions than
the minimum ones guaranteed by the law. This evidence is not consistent with generalized
female preferences for lower spots in the lists. The evidence seems most consistent with the
existence of entrenched male-dominated political machines, especially in less competitive
environments.
Finally, we ￿nd that discrimination against females by party machines had not impacted
disproportionally the supply of highly-quali￿ed female candidates. Names and surnames
are quite informative of educational and socioeconomic status in Spain. However, the new
women attracted by the quotas were not on average of higher socioeconomic backgrounds,
as captured by their names.
The paper contributes to an extensive literature on discrimination in labor markets
(Becker, 1957). There is clear evidence of gender discrimination in hiring (Goldin and Rouse,
2000), and product markets (Ayres and Siegelman, 1995). A related literature on ethnic dis-
crimination has studied market-driven preferences for segregation (see Saiz and Wachter,
2011, for a recent example and references therein) and in other less conventional environ-
ments (Kahn, 1991; Szymaski, 2000; Price and Wolfers, 2010). Municipal elections allow us
to study a very relevant setting, yet one where a very good performance measure is available:
electoral results. Moreover, because quotas were unexpected and only imposed on some mu-
nicipalities, we have an essentially random selection of treated and untreated municipalities,
that allows us to eliminate the e￿ects of potentially confounding factors.
Our paper complements previous evidence about the importance of internal political
machines to account for female under-representation. Sanbonmatsu (2002) ￿nds that women
are less likely to be represented in US state legislatures where parties have more control over
nominations. Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2009) show that parties place female candidates
strategically in the positions that are less likely to a￿ect the chances of election of male
candidates. The paper also relates, somewhat distantly, to a large recent literature on
the policy e￿ects of females in power (e.g. Chattopadhyay and Du￿o, 2004; Beaman et
al., 2009).2 This literature has focused mainly on the policy outcomes of female elected
2The literature on the impact of women in power on parliamentary votes, budget levels, budget composi-
tion, government stability, and government e￿ciency is now quite large. Note that we do not have much to
contribute to this speci￿c literature, since we are not examining the policy impact of the additional elected
women due to the quota., Instead, we use the natural experiment to learn about the causes of female under-
representation in the lists. For the reader interested on women politicians and outcomes, other examples
4leaders, e￿ects of quotas on the number of elected females, or the change in attitudes towards
women once they are elected, and not on the intrinsic causes that account for women under-
representation.
Finally, the paper is related to an emerging literature that tries to explain gender in-
equality. Several explanations have been proposed, such as the existence of di￿erences in
gender attitudes towards competition (Gneezy and Rustichini, 2004; Gneezy et al., 2003).
These theories are focused on explaining why the average woman may be less likely to seek
powerful positions; however, they cannot by themselves account for the lack of women at the
top since, in a competitive environment, there could be enough available women at the right
tails of the ambition-ability joint distribution to satisfy hypothetical customer demand for
more balanced gender allocations in the relatively few powerful positions. As we argue using
an electoral model, we will not be able to fully understand female under-representation in
positions of power unless we consider the interaction between the demand-side in political
markets (voter preferences), the marginal supply of quali￿ed female inputs at the tails of the
ability distribution, and the industrial organization of the market (the role of parties and the
degree of electoral competition).
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the Spanish municipal elections
and their 2007 reform. In section 3 we develop a simple model of electoral competition
that nests the theories that can potentially explain low female representation. The model
illustrates what each of these theories predicts the e￿ects of the electoral reform should
be. Section 4 describes the data that we use to test the di￿erent theories, and section 5
explains the results. Some alternative explanations are assessed in section 6. We o￿er some
concluding remarks in section 7.
2 Municipal Elections and Electoral Reform
The election of town councilors in Spain is done using closed lists. This means that voters vote
for a list, rather than a person. Each list must present a number of candidates equal to the
number of council seats at stake (11 for municipalities between 2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants;
13 for municipalities between 5,000 and 10,000). A large number of lists concur under the
umbrella of national or regional political parties, albeit the existence of local independent
lists is not uncommon. Voters vote for the lists as a whole, and the council seats are
apportioned proportionally to the number of votes according to the d’Hont method. The
of this burgeoning literature include: Welch (1985), Swers (1998), Rehavi (2007), Clots-Figueras (2009),
Funk and Gathman (2010), De Paola et al. (2010), Gallarduci and Passerman (2010), Ferreyra and Gyourko
(2010), Cavalcanti and Tavares (2011). Campa (2010) studies the impact of quotas in Spain on the provision
of childcare.
5law, however, establishes a minimum vote threshold of 5% in order for a list to qualify for the
apportionment of council seats. The council members are then drawn from each list using
the exact ordering in which the candidates appear listed.
Upon convening for the ￿rst time, the council elects a mayor, typically the ￿rst person
in the most-voted list. Importantly, only the ￿rst person in each list can be considered in
the initial mayoral vote. The council also acts as a representative legislative body passing
and enacting all local budgets, laws, regulations, and tax codes for a period of four years.
On March 22, 2007, the ￿Law for the equality of women and men￿ was passed by the
Parliament.3 It required all candidate lists for the municipal (and other) elections to contain
at least 40 percent of candidates of each gender. Moreover, in order to prevent parties from
placing all women at the bottom of the list, the law required this proportion to be maintained
for every bracket of ￿ve positions. Nevertheless, the law speci￿ed an exception to the quota
in those municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants.
The law applied for the ￿rst time to the municipal elections that followed on May 27,
2007. In the previous election of May 25, 2003, no such legal change had been contemplated.
Indeed, the passing of the law was made possible by the results of the 2004 general election,
which were largely unanticipated (Montalvo, 2009). Only days before the Madrid train
bombings of March 11th 2004 the Christian-Democratic Party (PP) was widely expected to
win the elections. The bombings and post-attack management from the incumbent party
changed the sentiment of many voters towards the Social-Democratic party (PSOE) , which
won the elections four days after the terrorist strike. It is therefore quite unlikely that the
share of female candidates in the municipal elections of 2003 re￿ected an anticipation of the
female quotas that were imposed in 2007.
3 Female Representation and Quotas: A Comprehensive
Framework
There are several reasons why the number of women in powerful positions may be low. First,
political parties may behave as if they were discriminating against women by ￿elding less
women in electable positions (Sanbonmatsu, 2002, 2006; Bagues and Esteve-Volart, 2009).
This could be due to (traditionally male) powerful elites explicitly failing to promote women.
Alternatively it could be due to internal organizational dynamics that implicitly favor men
(Reuben et al., 2010), or by the desire of women to avoid competition (Gneezy et al., 2003,
Niederle and Vesterlun, 2007) for power within the parties ( non-adversarial behavior within
3This law has a broad reach, a￿ecting both the public and private sectors. But we describe here only the
implications for the municipal elections that we study in this paper.
6organizations). All these explanations can be encompassed under what we name the ￿party
discrimination theory.￿
A second reason for observing low female participation resides in the tastes of voters.
As long as voters prefer to be governed by men, political parties will rationally respond by
restricting access to women. They will do so in order to increase the chances of winning,
even if the parties themselves do not have a taste for discrimination. We call it the ￿voter
preference theory.￿ Du￿o and Topalova (2004) and Beaman et al (2009) ￿nd evidence that
male voters in India report preferring male politicians. However, they also ￿nd that discrim-
inatory preferences dissipate with better knowledge of the candidate. These are important
contributions in the context of villages in a developing country with very large social strati￿-
cation. Nevertheless less is known about e￿ective voting preferences for women candidates in
more developed countries, with existing research in political science providing arguments on
both sides based on correlational and survey evidence (see Dolan, 2004, 2005, for a US-based
discussion).
Finally, low female participation may also be the result of self-selection into political
activities leaving parties with a worse pool of female contenders. This explanation is related
to statistical discrimination theories (Arrow, 1973, and Knowles et al., 2001). Potential
female candidates may be less able than male contenders if politics is inherently more com-
petitive, and women shy away from competitive environments ( non-adversarial behavior in
open markets). Talented women may also avoid a career in politics if such jobs o￿er a worse
family-life balance than other alternatives (Lawless and Fox, 2005; Goldin and Katz, 2008;
Bertrand et al., 2010). In general, as documented by Crosson and Gneezy (2008), there are
a number of psychological di￿erences between genders that could have high-ability females
see themselves as less suitable politicians (Lawless and Fox, 2005). We term this explanation
the ￿self-selection theory.￿
In this section we develop a theoretical framework that encompasses these three theories
of low female representation. The model highlights the di￿erent predictions that the three
theories make about the e￿ects of imposing female quotas on parties’ lists. These predictions
will help us discern among the empirical validity of the di￿erent theories. The model is also
helpful as an intellectual placeholder that consolidates the ideas in what is a very diverse
literature on women in power.
3.1 The Setup
Consider two parties located at the extremes of the interval [0;1]. Each party must choose a
continuum of candidates with a mass of 1. The fraction of candidates that are elected from
7this list is determined by the fraction of votes that each party gets.
There is a continuum of voters located uniformly on [0;1]. Their location on the line
represents their policy preferences. Voters care for the policies of the parties, for the average
competence of their candidates, and the share of women on their lists. We represent the
preferences of a voter located in x 2 [0;1] as: u(x;p) = v   t
2 jp   xj + Ap   dv (x)Wp,
where u(x;p) represents the utility from voting for the party located in p 2 f0;1g. The term
  t
2 jp   xj captures the disutility from voting a party whose policy p di￿ers from the preferred
policy x. The parameter t measures the degree of competition among the two parties (how
substitutable they are for voters). Ap is the average ability of party p’s candidates, and Wp
is the share of women on its list. The parameter dv (x)  0 measures voter x’s distaste for
voting for female candidates. We assume that dv (x) is a monotonic function, and satis￿es
jd0
v (x)j <   1 for all x 2 [0;1].4 Alternatively, a voter may also abstain from voting, and
obtain u(x;;) = u. This utility can be thought of as the opportunity cost of voting.
We assume that parties cannot choose their ideology and policies (set at the national
level) but can choose the identity of their candidates. They do so simultaneously, Æ la
Cournot. Each party has a pool of potential candidates to choose from. Let fpm and fpw be
the density functions for the distributions of ability of men and women contenders to become
candidates for party p. We assume throughout that there exists a constant apg such that we
can write fpg (x) = fg (x   apg) for p 2 f0;1g, g 2 fm;wg: the distribution of ability is the
same for both parties, except for a mean shifter. 5 We denote the corresponding distribution
functions with capital letters.
Parties choose their candidate lists with the objective of maximizing p = Vp=(V0 + V1) 
dpWp, where Vp is the number of votes received by party p, and dp is the party machine’s
distaste for having women on its list. Therefore, both parties want to increase their share of
the votes, but may also like to decrease the number of women on their list.
Given their preferences, voters located on [0;x0] vote for party 0, voters located on [x1;1]
vote for party 1, and voters located on (x0;x1) abstain, where xp denotes the marginal voter
of party p.6 Hence, we have that V0 = x0 and V1 = 1   x1. Notice that when no voter
abstains, the marginal voters of both parties coincide, and we will write x = x0 = x1.
4As will become clear later, to fully comprehend the empirical evidence, it is important to have het-
erogeneity in the voters’ preferences for discrimination, and this heterogeneity being correlated with the
preferences for the parties. On the other hand, assuming that d0
v (x) is not too large (in absolute terms)
guarantees that the parties’ objective function is well behaved.
5This encompasses, for instance, the case in which ability is normally distributed with the same variance
2 for all parties and genders, while the mean may vary by party and gender. The assumption
also allows the variance to vary by gender, as long as for each gender both parties have the same
variance.
6This result follows from the assumption that jd0
v (x)j < 1, that guarantees that the voters’ preference
over the location of the parties dominates the preference over the number of women.
8This model captures with simplicity the three theories described above. The party dis-
crimination theory states that dp > 0. Under the voter discrimination theory, dv (x) > 0.
And ￿nally, the selection theory can be captured by the di￿erence between fpw and fpm.
In the following section we describe the implications of these theories for the selection of
candidates.
3.2 The Economics of Gender Selection
For a given share of women, parties are interested in maximizing the average ability of their
candidates. They will consequently choose the best male and female candidates among the
pool of contenders of each gender. Therefore, parties optimally set standards apm and apw
such that p’s list contains all male contenders with a  apm and all female contenders with





















where the last equality holds because the number of men and women add up to unity. Since











and, e￿ectively, party p only has one instrument to
maximize its objectives: apw.
Consider what happens when u is su￿ciently low to induce all voters to turn out to vote.
The marginal voter is now implicitly de￿ned by the equation: x = 1
2+1
t [(A0   A1)   dv (x)(W0   W1)].









Applying the implicit function theorem to the equation that de￿nes x, and di￿erentiating
Ap and Wp with respect to apw, we can write the ￿rst-order condition as:
apw   apm = dv (x) + dp [t + d
0
v (x)(W0   W1)]:
This equation de￿nes the optimal selection policy of party p, determining the levels of the
ability standards for men and women. 7
7The second derivative of the objective function is negative at the optimum when dv is constant. Therefore,
9When neither parties nor voters discriminate dv = dp = 0. In this case, apw = apm, so
that men and women face the same standard. Parties maximize the average ability of their
candidate list, regardless of the gender of the candidates. This, however, does not mean that
women share the positions equally with men: more men are chosen on the party’s list if they
are more politically able than women, and fpm ￿rst-order stochastically dominates fpw.
When either parties or voters discriminate, the ability standard for women increases while
the standard for men is lowered. dv and dp determine then the ability di￿erence that party
p requires to accept a women on the list.
To gain some intuition, suppose ￿rst that voters discriminate, but parties do not, so that
dv (x) > 0 and dp = 0. When optimizing the candidate list, parties are actually maximizing
the utility of the marginal voter x. Since voter x has a taste for discrimination of dv (x),
this voter is willing to substitute a woman for a man in order to reduce Wp as long as the
di￿erence in ability between the man and the woman is smaller than dv (x). Therefore parties
targeting this marginal voter choose a list such that: apw   apm = dv (x).8 In this list, the
ability of the marginal woman exceeds the ability of the marginal man by exactly dv (x).
On the other hand, suppose that voters do not have discriminatory tastes, but parties
do, so that dv (x) = 0 and dp > 0. Now the optimal selection policy sets apw   apm = dpt.
Parties are willing to sacri￿ce votes in order to decrease the number of women. The bene￿ts
for party p from dropping a women from the list, dp, has to be weighted against the cost
in votes, which depends on the degree of competition t. If t is large, the election is less
competitive, and the electoral results are less sensitive to the number of women on party
p’s list. Hence this party can use a selection policy that is more responsive to its taste for
discrimination. On the other hand, if t is low, the contest is very competitive. Voters do
not have a strong preference for a party’s policy. As a result, voters are more sensitive to
the ability of party candidates. A decrease in the quality of candidates results in more votes
being lost to the other party. Consequently, parties do not respond so strongly to their
preferences for discrimination.
When voters and parties discriminate simultaneously, the di￿erences in quali￿cation stan-
dards for men and women re￿ect the preferences for discrimination of both. Parties can
decrease the number of women without cost (indeed, they bene￿t) as long as their marginal
voter demands it. When the di￿erence in standards surpasses dv (x), increasing apw   apm
to reduce the number of women comes at the cost of a loss of votes. As earlier, parties will
there exists a  > 0 such that the second-order conditions are satis￿ed as long as jd0
v (x)j <  for all x 2 [0;1].
8Notice that the optimal selection of candidates follows a marginalist argument: how much more able
should the marginal woman be than the marginal man, for a party to stay indi￿erent. It is therefore
not surprising that the optimal policy does not depend on the distribution of talent for men and women.
Although the ￿nal number of women that will be selected does depend on those distributions.
10still want to do it as long as that cost does not exceed dp. The loss of votes still depends
on how competitive the election is. But now it also depends on how much preferences for
discrimination change as the marginal voter shifts closer to the party’s location. This addi-
tional e￿ect￿d0
v (x)(W0   W1)￿is positive for the party with fewer women if its more loyal
voters also have a stronger taste for discrimination: this party would ￿nd that reducing the
number of women has a smaller cost. As the marginal voter gets closer to its location, he
discriminates more, and therefore, penalizes the party less for the smaller number of women.
When turnout is lower than 100%, the results are analogous. If u is su￿ciently high, the
voters in intermediate locations abstain. Now, party p’s marginal voter is indi￿erent between
voting that party and abstention. Therefore : Vp = 2
t [v   u + Ap   dv (xp)Wp], and party






The ￿rst-order condition for this problem leads to a similar condition characterizing the
optimal policy of party p:













If voters have discriminatory tastes, parties respond by maximizing the preferences of the
marginal voter. However, the marginal voter is now di￿erent for each party. Hence, parties
may select di￿erent number of women simply because they are targeting di￿erent voters.
Likewise, when parties discriminate, the response to their taste for discrimination depends
on the competitiveness of the election t. However, the size of their constituency now becomes
important. To see why, consider what transpires when party p loses one voter. This voter
will abstain, instead of voting for the other party, as before. When party p obtains the
majority of the votes in the election, any lost vote translates now into a smaller decrease in
the list’s voting share.9 Therefore, the party ￿nds it less costly to discriminate. This e￿ect
is analogous to the e￿ect of low competition.
To obtain some intuition for the e￿ects of introducing female quotas, consider ￿rst what
happens when one party is unilaterally forced to increase the number of women on its list.
If this party discriminated against women, the average ability of its candidates will increase,
and hence so will voters’ preferences for that party. The party’s electoral results improve
as a result. On the contrary, when voters discriminate, or when female contenders are less
talented than male candidates, increasing the number of women decreases the voters’ utility
9Notice that the change in the share of votes of party p due to a change in Vp, which is given by
V1 p=(V0 + V1)
2, is decreasing in Vp.
11from voting that party, which will obtain worse electoral results.
This intuition suggests testing for the existence of party discrimination by looking at
the e￿ects of a forced increase in the number of women. However, in practice, quotas are
imposed on all parties. We must therefore take into account the equilibrium implications of
imposing quotas on both parties.
3.3 Equilibrium E￿ects of Female Quotas
The e￿ect of imposing female quotas on the candidate lists depends in a systematic way on the
parameters fpw;fpm;dv; and dp. Nevertheless, the three theories of low female participation
described above make di￿erent predictions about the outcomes.
First, consider the hypothesis of party discrimination. To isolate the e￿ects of this theory,
assume that voters do not have a preference for discrimination, and there are no di￿erences
in the gender distributions of talent. Under this strong null hypothesis, if party 0 selected
fewer women on its list, it must be because it discriminated more ( d0 > d1) at the expense of
higher candidate abilities. As a result, imposing binding female quotas increases the average
ability of its candidates by more than in party 1. Since voters value the ability of candidates,
party 0 becomes more attractive, and gains more votes than party 1 does when quotas are
imposed. Indeed, when no voter abstains, party 0 can only gain votes at the expense of
party 1, whose votes are reduced. The e￿ect of quotas on turnout is positive, as long as the
outside option of voters is binding, and some of them decide not to vote. Otherwise, turnout
remains una￿ected. The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 1 (Party discrimination). Suppose that d0;d1 > 0, while fpw = fpm for p 2
f0;1g, and dv = 0. Suppose also that W0 < W1  1
2 when no female quotas are imposed.





(weakly) increases turnout, and increases the
number of votes for party 0 by more than for party 1. Indeed, if turnout is 100% without
female quotas, then a female quota decreases the number of votes for party 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note from proposition 1 that the results for one party are always relative to what the
other party is doing. If the two parties have the same initial number of women, then quotas
have no e￿ects on the electoral results because they a￿ect both parties equally. Only relative
increases in the number of women caused by the quota a￿ects positively the electoral results.
If female under-representation was driven by voter discrimination against women, the op-
posite is true. In this case, parties rationally responded to the voters’ taste for discrimination
by decreasing the share of women on their lists. Quotas, therefore, decrease the utility of
12voters, and may lead to a decrease in turnout. Moreover, if party 0 starts with a lower share
of women it must be because its voters have a stronger preference for discrimination. Their
utility would decrease by more than that of party 1’s voters for two reasons. First, having
a stronger taste for discrimination, party 0’s voters su￿er more from any given increase in
the number of women. Furthermore, because party 0 had fewer women, it is also forced to
increase the number of women by more than party 1. Therefore, quotas will hurt party 0
more, and it will lose more votes than party 1, as a result.10
Proposition 2 (Voter preferences). Suppose that, for all x, dv (x) > 0 and monotonic, while
fpw = fpm for p 2 f0;1g, and d0 = d1 = 0. Suppose also that W0 < W1  1
2 when no female





(weakly) decreases turnout, and
decreases the number of votes for party 0 by more than for party 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that the existence of di￿erences in the number of women before the quotas were
introduced implies that turnout was less than 100%. Di￿erences in the number of women
can only arise when parties target voters with di￿erent preferences.
Finally, suppose that women under-representation was not due to parties or voters dis-
criminating against female candidates. In that case, both parties set apw = apm. The
self-selection hypothesis thus requires fpm to ￿rst-order stochastically dominate fpw. As a
result, the party with the lower number of female candidates must have fewer high ability
female contenders, relative to the number of male contenders. Hence, forcing the parties to
have an equal number of male and female candidates decreases the average ability of this
party’s list by more. This theory also predicts that quotas lower turnout, since they decrease
the utility of voters.
Proposition 3 (Self-selection). Suppose that apw < apm for p 2 f0;1g, while dv = 0, and
d0 = d1 = 0. Suppose also that W0 < W1  1
2 when no female quotas are imposed. Then,





(weakly) decreases turnout, and decreases the number of
votes for party 0 by more than for party 1. Indeed, if turnout is 100% with female quotas,
then a female quota increases the number of votes for party 1.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is di￿cult to distinguish the voter-preferences and self-selection theories in the data,
as they both make similar predictions. But the party discrimination theory makes opposite
claims. Hence, we can test whether parties discriminated against women by looking at the
10The monotonicity of dv (x) ensures this is the case.
13e￿ects of the increase in female participation caused by quotas on total voter turnout, and
on the share of votes received by a given party. To the extent that parties discriminate, we
expect to see a positive e￿ect of an increase in female participation on voter turnout.
The theory also suggests that the variable that determines the change in the performance
of a given party is not the absolute increase in its number of women caused by the quota.
Instead, it is the relative increase with respect to the other party that is relevant. To the
extent that parties discriminated, a relative increase in female participation in a given party
will a￿ect positively its performance in the elections. We now take these predictions to the
data.
4 The Data
The Spanish State Department (Ministerio del Interior) collects information related to the
electoral process. On request, we obtained a non-con￿dential subset of their data. Concretely
we were provided with the name of all candidates by list in all municipal ballots in the 2007
and 2003 elections11, their gender in 2007 (a disclosure required by the Equality Law), their
list a￿liation to major parties, information about each individual’s position in the lists, and
on whether they resulted elected. We also have information about the number of votes for
all lists presented, fraction of null or blank votes, the estimated municipal population for
legal purposes, and the number of registered voters in each town.
We imputed gender in 2003 by using the ￿rst name of the candidate. Names in Spain
have very strong gender orientation and only a very small portion of candidates in 2007 had
names that could be ascribed to either sex, which made the imputation straightforward.
Since the law applied only to municipalities with more than 5,000 inhabitants, we can
only obtain meaningful results around this threshold. Population sizes follow an approxi-
mately Pareto distribution, so there is a very large amount of very small municipalities with
population in the few hundreds that probably do not provide us with a very good comparison
group. In order to ensure both comparability and large enough sample sizes we therefore
restrict our sample to those municipalities with populations between 2,000 and 8,000 inhab-
itants. However, the results are not in the least sensitive to variations in this threshold, as
we demonstrate later. We also collected data on unemployment rates (a very good local
socioeconomic status indicator in Spain), and other economic characteristics of the towns.
These additional characteristics never mattered for any results in the paper and are mostly
omitted insofar most speci￿cations include municipal ￿xed e￿ects. Furthermore, the evi-
dence is consistent with the experimental design: there were no di￿erences in observables on
11Other characteristics, such as the birth date, have been suppressed from the data for con￿dentiality.
14both sides of the Equality Law discontinuity 12.
5 Empirical Evidence
5.1 Equality Law and the Surge in Female Politicians
The legal reform implemented in 2007 required all political parties to present candidate lists
containing at least 40 percent of women. However, it is not obvious what the percentage
of women politicians would have been in the absence of the quota. In Table 1 we examine
nonparametrically whether the law had a real sizable e￿ect on the proportion of women
in the candidate lists of the 2007 municipal elections. We do so by presenting transition
matrices for repeat lists by number of women in both the 2003 and 2007 elections (pre and
post quota). Repeat lists are those that used the same party a￿liation in both elections. In
fact, 72 percent of party candidatures in 2007 were also present in the previous elections. 13
It is very clear that the law was binding and that most repeat lists quickly complied with
the new legislation. The di￿erences between the control municipalities (with populations
between 2,000 and 4,999) and treatment (between 5,000 and 8,000) are stark. The distribu-
tion of lists by number of women was quite similar in the 2003 elections. However, almost
all candidatures with less than ￿ve women in the list in 2003 in the treated municipalities
transitioned toward having ￿ve or more. The Equality Law allowed for rounding the pro-
portion of women to the closest integer, and thus in order to comply a candidature should
have at least 5 women. However, most treated candidatures decided to include at least 6
women, perhaps because of uncertainty about the application of the numerical thresholds.
Only 1.13% of the lists seemed not to fully comply. 14
In Table 2 we use a regression discontinuity approach to assess the actual average treat-
ment e￿ect of the law on female political participation. This design allows us to use the
share of women in the lists of the control municipalities as a counterfactual, and to estimate
the average treatment e￿ect of the law on female participation and other outcomes. The
regression format also allows us to include all electoral lists by municipality pre and post
treatment. In column 1 we start by using only the data from the 2007 elections at the
municipal level. The model that we estimate takes the form:
Wi07 = DiEL + Pd (
0;Popi07) + "i07 (1)
12Interested reader should see Appendix Table 2
13We study patterns of list attrition later, and we will show that list attrition is not a problem in this
￿repeat sample￿ estimation.
14It is also possible that the gender of some of the candidates may have been recorded with error.
15Where the subscript i denotes a municipality; Wi07 is the dependent variable of interest:
the share of women concurring to the municipal elections in 2007 in each town; DiEL = 0
if Popi07 < 5000 and DiEL = 1 if Popi07 > 5000 is the treatment dummy signifying the
local adoption of the Equality Law, Popi07 is the municipality population in 2007, and
Pd (0;Popi07) is a polynomial of degree d with a vector of parameters 0 that vary on both
sides of the population discontinuity that de￿nes the law (5000 inhabitants). Note that
the polynomial on population is fully interacted by the inequality law dummy and di￿erent
parameters are allowed on both sides of the discontinuity. We choose a functional form where
d = 3, but results are not sensitive at all to our speci￿cation of Pd (0;Popi07) (such as higher
order polynomials, including a simple linear population control, or omitting the term in the
municipality ￿xed e￿ects regressions that we ￿nally implement throughout).
The results show a 7.2% increase in the share of women in the parties’ lists for the
municipalities that were a￿ected by the law, as compared to una￿ected municipalities. The
identi￿cation strategy is based on the assumption that the share of women politicians in a
town may change continuously with respect to population levels, so that any e￿ects associated
to moving from a municipality just below 5000 inhabitants to one above are due to the law.
In column 2 we show the results to be robust to regional dynamics by including ￿xed e￿ects
for each of the 50 provinces in the country. 15
We next check if the results could be driven by exogenous factors that change discon-
tinuously when a municipality reaches 5000 inhabitants. First we run a placebo regression
for the 2003 elections, where no equality law existed. The results in column 3 yield a very
precisely estimated zero, suggesting that the e￿ects in 2007 were driven by the legal change.
To control for unobservable variables that di￿er on both sides of the discontinuity more gen-
erally, we next specify empirical models that use both election years: pre and post Equality
Law. The equation that we estimate becomes:
Wit = DiEL  D07 + D07 + Pd (
0;Popit) +
X
Mi + "it (2)
In this equation t is a time subscript (t=03,07), D07 is a post-treatment dummy (for year
2007). The model is saturated with 1,437 municipal ￿xed e￿ects ( Mi), one for each town
in the relevant sample, and all variation is coming from changes within municipalities. The
results in column 4 show conclusively that the increase in women politicians was larger in
treated municipalities after the treatment. In quantitative terms, treated municipalities saw
an increase in 8.5 percentage points in the fraction of women in lists. Since the fraction of
15In unreported regressions we also controlled for the unemployment rate and other measures of local
industrial composition and amenities without any change in the results. None of the controls was signi￿cant
in explaining women political power.
16women in the treated sample was 33 percent before the Equality Law this implies a very
large shock to the number of women candidates of 25 percent. 16
One of the interesting aspects of the Equality Law is that it required the presence of at
least two women for every ￿ve candidates as ranked in the lists. Thus, parties could not
place all women at the bottom of the list. This was quite important for the new women to
have chances of being elected. 78.49% of the lists in the treated interval of municipalities
(an average of 3 lists by municipality) obtained 5 seats or less in the 2007 elections. Only
2.5 percent of lists obtained more than eight seats. Therefore, individuals in lower positions
in the list of 13 are widely perceived as ￿token￿ candidates. We ￿nd, in column 5, that
the law did have a very similar causal impact in the top 5 positions with respect to the
counterfactual. However, in column 6 we also show that the increase in the percentage of
elected women was about only half of the magnitude of the increase in women participation.
This suggests that the new women were placed in less electable positions in those lists that
had chances of winning, an aspect to which we come back later. 17
Overall, the data show a very signi￿cant e￿ect of the equality law, increasing the share of
women in the municipal lists and, to a smaller extent, the share of elected women. Moreover,
the e￿ects are very consistent throughout all the speci￿cations, suggesting this natural exper-
iment provides us with a robust empirical design. Hereafter we treat the increase in female
politicians in the treated municipalities as exogenous and exploit this source of variation to
identify the causal e￿ect of female political candidacy on turnover and electoral results.
5.2 Availability of Quali￿ed or Willing Women
It is possible that female political under-representation be explained by the lower supply
of quali￿ed and willing female candidates. After all, according to the Spanish statistical
o￿ce (Instituto Nacional de Estad￿stica) only 34.08% of party a￿liates in the largest parties
were women in 2007, and an estimate for 2003 is of about 33% (Verges, 2006). Yet these
statistics cannot account for the even lower percentage of women at the top of the local
lists in 2003 (only 16%), or top 2 (22%), or for the smaller share of elected women in 2003
(28%), suggesting that women a￿liated with parties were placed in less electable positions.
Furthermore, the number of relevant positions in the lists is very small and it should be
straightforward to ￿nd enough female candidates if voter demand justi￿ed increasing the
female share. Indeed, we provide here further evidence that is inconsistent with parties
16In Appendix Table 2 we vary the bandwidth around the treatment threshold of 5000 inhabitants in vari-
ous ways, and the results are entirely consistent throughout, not only in terms of the sign of the coe￿cients,
but also in the size of the e￿ects.
17If the order of female candidates in the lists were random, we would obtain the same coe￿cient for the
e￿ect of the law on the share of female candidates and female elected candidates.
17having trouble to ￿nd quali￿ed female candidates for their lists.
The ￿rst test to see if there was a lack of quali￿ed female candidates implies analyzing
the patterns of list survival after the law. This analysis is also important to assess to which
extent previous results could be explained by list attrition correlated with the law. In Table
3, column 1, we present the results of a linear model where we account for the probability of
a 2003 list not repeating in 2007. The regression, which includes national party ￿xed e￿ects
and population size polynomials, does not ￿nd any relationship between list attrition and
female quotas. The number of women in 2003 was not generally associated with attrition
either, and the only variable that predicts attrition was the share of vote in 2003 (more-voted
parties tended to repeat). The results in column 2 show further that it did not appear to be
substantially harder to come up with minimally-quali￿ed female candidates for those lists
that were far from the 40 percent female target in the treated municipalities. Finally, in
column 3, we see that the law was not associated with a lower propensity for new lists to
arise either. Here we are using 2007 list data and the dependent variable is a dummy that
takes value one if the list did not appear in the previous elections (a new list). If the absence
of quali￿ed or willing women had been a major issue we would have expected to ￿nd some
e￿ect on list formation, if only for the more marginal lists.
Another margin of adjustment if quali￿ed women were scarce would have been to in-
crease the retention rate of existing willing female candidates. Since we have the full name
of candidates we can trace their participation across years and lists. Interestingly, in the
untreated municipalities in 2007 the probability that a woman had already been in the list
on the previous election￿32 percent￿was much lower than the equivalent percentage for
men: 43.55 percent. Women candidates experienced higher turnover between elections than
men, a fact that is not explained by the position in the list they occupied (similar results
are obtained when conditioning on list rank). Therefore, if quali￿ed women candidates were
truly scarce one would expect more e￿orts geared toward increasing their retention rate. In
Table 4, we estimate linear probabilistic models with the following structure:
Xcit = '1DiEL  D07 + '2D07 + Pd ('
0;Popit) +
X
Mi + "cit (3)
where Xcit is a dummy or indicator variable describing an attribute of candidate c in town
i at time t. In column 1 the dummy variable takes value unity if the candidate is a women:
'1 here is the impact of the quota on the share of women. 18 In column 2 the dependent
variable is now a dummy that takes value one if the candidate is a women appearing for the
18The estimates are now slightly-di￿erently estimated. Concretely, in Table 2 each municipality is an
observation whereas here we are giving more weight to municipalities with more candidates. Note that we
are now genuinely interested in candidate-level estimates.
18￿rst time in the list in 2007. The coe￿cient estimates are very similar to those in column
1: parties did not ￿ll in the new ￿female￿ positions required by the quota by increasing the
retention of women, but just brought in new women to the lists. In columns 3 and 4 we
repeat these regressions, this time focusing in the top ￿ve positions. While the quota had to
imply an absolute increase in the number of women overall, parties could have easily shifted
existing incumbent lower-ranked candidates into the top positions. What we ￿nd, however,
is that 81 percent of these top-5 positions were actually ￿lled with new women, and this
share increases to 87 percent for the top-3 positions. When parties were forced to place
females in top positions new women stepped in to take on the challenge.
All in all, existing and new parties in towns a￿ected by female quotas did not make e￿orts
to increase the retention rate of past women candidates and did not have any problems ￿lling
their lists with more and new female candidates. At the top, parties did not need to promote
lower-ranked candidates. There was no list attrition or increased di￿culties for new lists to
arise. This evidence is not consistent with the existence of major supply constrains on
quali￿ed female candidates.
5.3 Do Voters Dislike Female Politicians?
5.3.1 Voter Turnout and Protest Votes
As we discussed earlier, an important test to gauge the existence of voter preferences or
di￿erences in quality between male and female candidates is to examine changes in turnout
rates associated with an exogenous increase in the number of female politicians: did some
voters stay at home more often rather than voting for female candidates?
In table 5 we analyze the relationship between female-politician frequency and voter
participation. Voter turnout is quite high in these local elections (with an unweighted average
of 73 percent of registered voters across the treatment and control municipalities attending
to the polls).
It is very di￿cult a priori to know if the presence of women politicians is frowned upon
by some voters. In fact, in Table 5 column 1, simple OLS regressions at the municipality
and year level (standard errors clustered by municipality) point in the opposite direction:
municipalities with more women in the lists tend to have higher voter turnouts. A town
with a ten percentage point higher share of female politicians can be expected to have a 1.45
percentage increase in voter turnout. Of course, this may only re￿ect the fact that in towns
with a more participative culture (or social capital) women are also more likely to become
politicians, an interesting fact by itself that we red-￿ag for future research. However, the
Equality Law provides us for an exogenous source of variation to examine the causal impact
19of female politicians on citizen interest in local politics. To do so we deploy the empirical
model:
V Tit = 1FemShait + 2D07 + Pd (
0;Popit) +
X
Mi + "it (4)
Where V T stands for the voter turnout rate in town i at time t = 03;07; FemShait is
the share of female candidates in the elections by municipality and year, and the rest of the
notation is consistent with previous speci￿cations. In order to take advantage of the large
exogenous increase in women participation we instrument the share of women candidates
with DiEL  D07, which is e￿ectively an indicator for the treated municipalities after the
law was enacted. The results, in Table 5 column 2, suggest that the positive association
between women political activism and voter participation was not causal. The coe￿cient is
a relatively precisely estimated zero.
Column 3 uses a more elaborate instrumental variable strategy. The share of women
candidates by municipality in 2003 was not a￿ected by the change in law, as it could not
be anticipated at that time that such law would be passed. Therefore, we can construct
a measure of how binding the law was for each municipality as the di￿erence between the
share of female candidates in 2003 and the 40 percent required in 2007. We now therefore
use DiELD07maxf0;0:4 FemShai03g as alternative instrument, yielding the same non-
signi￿cant results. The advantage of this alternative instrument is that now we are exploiting
di￿erences in how binding the law was across treated municipalities. In municipalities where
women were already active above the 40 percent threshold the law did not represent a
signi￿cant change to the electoral landscape. But it did in municipalities were women were
more severely underrepresented. In fact, in column 4, we go further and limit the sample
to treated municipalities only (between 5000 and 8000 inhabitants) therefore dispelling any
potential concerns about the quality of the control group. All of the variance is coming now
from the dosage intensity in the treatment e￿ect (law-driven change in the female politician
share) on the treated municipalities; the estimates are identical.
Finally, in column 5 we repeat a similar speci￿cation as in column 2, this time focusing
on the e￿ects of female politicians on the share of blank or null votes. These votes do not
a￿ect the results of the elections but voters could use them as a message of disapproval with
the political process. To the extent that voters were unhappy with an increasing leading role
of women in the electoral process, we may see an e￿ect on this type of votes. However, the
results show no signi￿cant e￿ect of female participation on the share of protest votes.
While we do not know the gender of the electorate (this information is kept con￿dential)
we remark that these zero results do not change across municipalities by the share of women
in the population. It appears therefore, unlikely that an increase in the propensity of women
20to vote o￿sets a corresponding decrease in male voters. Note further that, in any case, vote-
maximizing parties should not care about the identity of the electorate, but focus on the
total number of votes.
Overall, the patterns on voter turnover cannot o￿er a conclusive test to discriminate
among the di￿erent theories of low female participation. However the data are generally
not supportive of theories of voter demand for discrimination, as we did not see a decrease
in voter turnout or an increase in protest votes when and where the number of women
politicians increased by 25 percent due to the quotas.
5.3.2 Female Politicians and Electoral Results
The previous tests can be especially powerful against alternatives under the null hypothesis
that voters had strong preferences against female candidates, and those preferences were
quite homogeneous across lists. However, voters of di￿erent ideologies may have diverging
preferences. In that case, parties with a more biased electorate could optimally choose to ￿eld
fewer female candidates. As discussed earlier, an alternative, if observationally equivalent,
theory has di￿erent parties being di￿erently endowed with high-quality female candidates.
Parties that systematically have more di￿culty ￿nding quali￿ed women politicians should
￿eld less female candidates. Both theories suggest that exogenously forcing more female
candidates into lists in which these are underrepresented should reduce their electoral success.
Therefore we next examine if the lists in which the law was more binding lost electoral ground
after the law. The intuition for this approach can be reinforced by looking back at Table 1.
It is clear that treated electoral lists that concurred both to the 2003 and 2007 elections and
had a relatively small number of women on their lists had to make very large adjustments
vis-a-vis lists in the control group. Conversely, the growth in the share of women was much
smaller or nonexistent in the lists that had ￿elded 5 or more women in 2003 with respect to
the counterfactual. This suggests using the distance of the list to the 40 percent quota in
the treated municipalities as a list-speci￿c instrument for the exogenous growth in the lists’
female share. Concretely, the model that we estimate takes the form:




PAk + "ki (5)
4V otShaki is the change in the vote share for party k in municipality i between 2003 and
2007, and 4Femki the change in the number of women in the party’s list. PAk stand for
party ￿xed e￿ects: one dummy for each party that ￿elded lists in more than 10 municipalities
and an ￿other￿ dummy for the una￿liated lists (only 11 percent of the total). The party
￿xed e￿ects capture changes in voter sentiment toward the national or regional parties,
21which also tend to be dominant in local elections. Note that it is important here to include
municipal ￿xed e￿ects (
P
Mi) because overall changes in voting share should add to zero
across lists in the same municipality and the impact of a symmetric increase in the dependent
variables across all lists should wash out. Such symmetric changes within municipalities will
be captured by the municipal ￿xed e￿ects. Therefore, the results should be interpreted as
relationships between the variables’ deviations from their municipal means , which is in line
with what the model suggests is the appropriate comparison to test the various theories. In
this speci￿cation, we instrument 4FemShaki with the variable: DiELmaxf0;5 Femki;03g:
the pre-treatment distance to the minimum quota target (5 women in the treated sample)
interacted by an Equality Law treatment dummy. Intuitively, more women were ￿forced￿ into
lists that used to have fewer female candidates in order to comply with the quota (indeed
the ￿rst stage yields a coe￿cient of one and the instruments are very strong).
In Table 6, column 1, we ￿rst limit the estimation to the municipalities exposed to the
law. All the variance here is coming from the shock to female candidates implied by the
initial number of women in each list. The evidence is not supportive of the hypothesis that
the vote share decreased in those lists where a higher number women than optimal was
imposed by the law. In fact, surprisingly, we do ￿nd positive e￿ects of bringing more women
to these lists. These results are con￿rmed in column 2, where we include the observations
from the control group (una￿ected by the law).
Due to the unpredictability of the enactment of the law after the Madrid bombings and
the subsequent unexpected results in the general elections of 2004, it is very unlikely that
parties in treated municipalities had anticipated the e￿ect of the law by strategically choosing
the number of female candidates in 2003. Yet one of the concerns in these speci￿cations is
that the initial number of women could be signaling party attributes whose valuations were
changing between 2003 and 2007 . While lists with less women in 2003 may have been
di￿erent, note that because we are using ￿rst di￿erences in the relevant variables we are
e￿ectively removing any list-speci￿c e￿ects that do not change in time. Furthermore, we did
not ￿nd any evidence that the number of women in 2003 was predictive of changes in voting
shares in the control group or in an alternative sample of all untreated municipalities with
populations below 2000 inhabitants. However, the existence of a control group allows us to
be able to control for the number of women in 2003 on the right-hand side, which we do in
column 3.19 The results are now even larger albeit much more imprecisely estimated: the
lagged female candidate control is, of course, highly co-linear with the instrument. Clearly,
19The results are robust to assuming non-linearities in the e￿ect of previous female candidates. Including
a set of ￿xed e￿ects for each number of women in 2003 did not change the coe￿cients in column 3, and the
pre-treatment-women ￿xed e￿ects cannot be deemed to be statistically di￿erent from zero.
22there is no evidence of a negative impact of women on voting shares. Moreover, we cannot
reject a null direct e￿ect of the lagged number of women candidates on voting share growth,
which is the assumption that we carry forward.
A second concern with these results is that they may be driven by higher candidate
turnover. Indeed, one of the e￿ects of the quota was to increase the number of new candi-
dates. Could it be that voters relatively dislike women but like new candidates and that the
latter e￿ect dominated after the law? In column 4 we also control for the share of candidates
who were new to the list in 2007, but results do not change. We ￿nally control for potential
incumbent e￿ects in column 5 by introducing a dummy for lists that were the most voted
in the previous elections. While we do ￿nd evidence of wear-down for incumbent lists, that
does not change the relevant results.
The results are quite precisely estimated. Quantitatively, consider the hypothetical case
of a party that ran with 2 women candidates in 2003, whereas the remaining parties were
￿elding 5 each. Assuming that the other parties did not change the number of women,
this hypothetical list would be required to ￿eld 3 more women by law, increasing its voting
share by 2.7 percentage points. These results are clearly inconsistent with the hypothetical
existence of voter discrimination or with lower political ability of female candidates. Instead,
the results suggest the presence of party discrimination.
To examine further the nature of the positive impact of women, we separate the sample
of lists by the level of competition in their municipalities. Electoral results at the municipal
level are quite persistent. The correlation between the number of seats for repeat lists across
the two elections was 0.86. At the top, 75 percent of the winning lists in 2003 repeated as
winners in 2007. Losing lists in 2003, conversely, only had an 11 percent chance of winning.
The percentage of repeat winning lists increases to close to 90 percent in those municipalities
that we deem non-competitive. In our de￿nition, non-competitive municipalities are those
where the largest party obtained 7 or more seats (out of a total of 13) in 2003, an absolute
majority.
In column 6 (Table 6) we present separate results for non-competitive municipalities and
contrast them to those in more competitive environments (column 7). The results suggest
that the positive impact of women on electoral returns was concentrated in non-competitive
municipalities. Parties there seemed to have deviated more from the optimal gender mix.
In Table 7 we examine this issue further. Concretely we now ask if the initial share of
women politicians had been lower in noncompetitive municipalities relative to others. These
are purely descriptive OLS regressions with the share of women candidates in 2003 on the
left-hand-side and a dummy for non-competitive municipalities in that year on the right-
hand-side, together with population polynomials. The results in column 1 do not allow us
23to infer any di￿erences. However, when we focus on the more relevant top 5 positions, there
is some indication that parties in non-competitive towns were ￿elding less women (column
2). We then add a dummy for the winning list, and interact it with the non-competitive
election indicator. The descriptive evidence in column 3 is quite conclusive: entrenched
winning parties in non-competitive elections were ￿elding females in electable positions at a
rate 3.3 percentage points below the average (representing a 10% decrease in the number of
such electable females). In other words, men tended to be more prevalent in relatively ￿safe￿
positions for council seats. This observation, together with the fact that it was precisely in
those same positions that women increased votes, go against the view that males generally
perform better as politicians and that more males were thus required by party machines to
win these elections. This evidence is very consistent with Sanbonmatsu’s (2006) ￿nding that
￿women are less likely to run for and hold state legislative o￿ces where parties are stronger;￿
and with Bagues and Esteve-Volart (2010) who ￿nd that males are typically selected for the
￿safest￿ seats in the Senate.
The results are therefore more consistent with the view that lower female political ac-
tivism at the local level is not due to voter preferences or low ability, but to internal dynamics
within the parties. In incumbent parties that operated in less competitive environments these
gender power dynamics were more prevalent, perhaps because of the existence of entrenched
male candidates and the lesser need to appeal to broader constituencies. On the contrary, in
closer elections competition seemed to have mitigated party insiders’ ability to discriminate,
thereby ￿elding the most electable candidates for the list.
6 Alternatives to Voters’ Tastes
6.1 Did Women Shy Away from Competitive Positions?
All of the evidence so far points to the existence of internal party dynamics to explain lower
female political power, as opposed to voter preferences or a lack of women who are quali￿ed
and willing. Political parties seem to behave as if they have preferences for ￿elding male
candidates (d0;d1 > 0, in the model). One explanation for these ￿preferences￿ could come
from the behavior of women in competitive situations.
A number of papers demonstrate that women feel less comfortable and are less produc-
tive in competitive environments (Niederle and Vesterlun, 2007). This may lead females in
political parties to avoid competition by avoiding being in the list or by avoiding confronting
other candidates for better positions within the lists. Observably equivalent hypotheses have
female candidates wanting to avoid the stress or responsibility associated with more pow-
24erful or visible positions, or weighting the negative impact of child-rearing over the ability
to successfully perform as a leader. Did women systematically shy away from in￿uential
positions?
A way to test a strong null hypothesis on those lines is to consider what the outcome
should be if women focused solely on avoiding confrontation with males for high-responsibility
or more-visible positions. In this case, the more intrinsically-motivated male candidates
would be completely successful in capturing the highest positions in the list. Because the
Equality Law had women occupy two positions in the more in￿uential top ￿ve spots of each
list, we would expect women to systematically occupy positions 4 and 5 if their objective
was to minimize political responsibility. In Table 8, we examine the impact of the law on
the share of women at di￿erent levels in the lists. These are regressions at the list level
(conditioning on parties that appear in both elections), using both the pre-treatment and
post-treatment observations of both the treated and control municipalities and list ￿xed
e￿ects in order to control for party and municipal unobservables. The results con￿rm that
the average treated list experienced an increase in the share of women of 8 percentage points
in the top 5 positions (column 1). Interestingly, however, the impact of the law was of only
4.6 percentage points in the top 3 positions (column 2) and of 0.36 percentage points in the
top position (mayoral candidate). This suggests that, indeed, women candidates tended to
place in the lower positions: they were twice more likely to occupy positions 4 and 5 than
positions 1, 2, and 3. On the other hand, it seems that a considerable number of the new
women in the lists used the law to gain bargaining power, obtaining access to better positions
than those regulated by law.
In columns 4 through 6 we repeat the exercise, this time focusing on the lists that had
won the 2003 election. In these lists, where the top 3 positions consisted of ￿safe￿ seats
for the incumbent party, women had a harder time cracking through the ￿glass ceiling￿ of
position 4. In fact, the new women never dislodged existing mayoral candidates in these
incumbent lists.
On the other hand, the new women forced into at least the top 4 and 5 positions by the
quota were quite likely to make it into the top 3 positions and as number one in the non-
incumbent lists (albeit still below what one would expect from equal-chance randomization).
Clearly, many of these women took the opportunity provided by the law and leveraged their
increased bargaining power to ￿ght for the top positions. This evidence seems inconsistent
with a strong null hypothesis of generalized female lack of intrinsic motivation for power or
observationally equivalent hypotheses. While previous literature incontestably establishes
that women are less keen to compete on average and child rearing might be an issue for
many women, this need not a￿ect much equilibrium outcomes for the females at the very
25right tail of the competitiveness distribution if i) the number of power positions is very small
so that there are many more quali￿ed/ambitious women than positions; ii) consumers prefer
a more balanced gender mix; iii) markets are competitive so that entrenched male insiders
cannot discriminate against women.
Indeed, both the facts that these new women at the top in competitive lists needed
the law to leverage on their ambitions, and that their counterparts in incumbent parties
did not make it to the top appear more consistent with the existence of entrenched male
insider interests, and with perpetuating gender-power dynamics within the parties’ political
machines.
6.2 Endogenous Supply of Quali￿ed Women: Using High-Status
Names as Markers
An additional explanation for the evidence so far has the supply of available quali￿ed women
endogenously increasing after the quota in the treated municipalities. By increasing the
likelihood of being selected, quotas could make it more appealing for highly-quali￿ed women
to participate in the political process. Alternatively, the quotas could have helped break a bad
Nash equilibrium: prior to the quota, quali￿ed women did not show up because of a perceived
lack of opportunities, and parties were ￿elding less women for lack of quali￿ed candidates.
In that case, voters may have reacted positively to the higher quality of the new female
candidates, rather than showing their preference for more gender-balanced lists. Note that
if parties were informed and forward-looking, these stories imply, in the end, discriminatory
behavior: political machines were o￿ering lower positions to women, therefore screening out
highly-quali￿ed ambitious females at the cost of future lower voting shares.
However, the law made it more likely for women to be elected in all parties. Thus, a
general tendency for the law to attract more highly-quali￿ed women might have resulted in
a wash, and need not have been associated with party-speci￿c electoral gains. Furthermore,
a hypothetical endogenous increase in the supply of high-quality women across the board
cannot explain why it is precisely the non-competitive municipalities that drive the electoral
results.
In order for an endogenous change in the distribution of available women politicians to
explain the results, this candidate quality ought to have increased substantially more in non-
competitive incumbent parties than in others. But even in that case, such a theory could not
explain why non-competitive incumbent parties used to ￿eld less women candidates prior
to the law in the ￿rst place. Moreover, this alternative explanation also seems inconsistent
with the fact that incumbent parties were more likely to place the new women precisely in
26positions 4 and 5, the lowest positions required by the law. If the new women in incumbent
parties were now relatively more quali￿ed than the new women in other parties, we would
have expected the opposite to happen absent discriminatory preferences .
Yet, perhaps more elaborate stories could be produced to hypothesize the existence of
an endogenous-quality e￿ect. We can address this concern more directly by searching for
evidence of a change in the quality of the female candidate pool after the quota in the
treated municipalities. Unfortunately, we do not have any information about the candidates
themselves besides their name and gender. However, we can use the information about
socioeconomic status conveyed by names to gauge whether higher-status candidates were
attracted by the quotas.
A recent literature has pointed to the informational content of characteristically ethnic
names (Fryer and Levitt, 2004) or the surname choice of married women in the US (Goldin
ans Shim, 2004). Name assignation entails a conscious choice by parents, and is therefore
in￿uenced by their cultural milieu,revealing clues about their socioeconomic status (SES).
To operationalize this idea, we start by calculating the power status of all female ￿rst
names that appeared in the 2003 municipal lists. We have 70,556 female candidates and 1,388
distinctive ￿rst names. Female ￿rst names in this sample follow a Pareto-like distribution
with a few names accounting for a large fraction of the population. A surprising 38 percent
of the candidates have Maria or one of its composites (e.g. Maria Rosa) as their ￿rst name.
The top 20 names account for 60 percent of female candidates. In order to estimate accurate
status measures we focus on 212 names with more than 25 observations (encompassing 93
percent of the female sample). For such each name￿and the alternative category ￿other
name￿￿we calculate the average share of women that were elected in the 2003 elections. 20
We create a power index for each name by dividing the share of elected women bearing
that name by the average share of elected women in 1993 (approximately one in ￿ve women
resulted elected). In Table 9, panel A, columns 1 and 2 we display the names with the highest
and lowest relative eligibility. Low-status names in particular seem to follow two patterns:
they conform to our priors about naming conventions in low SES populations, or correspond
to names that became popular only recently (e.g. Laia or Mireia in the mid 80s and 90s)
and therefore single out very inexperienced candidates. Interestingly, the pervasive ￿Maria￿
has no informational content, with an electability ratio close to one. Smaller names in the
￿other￿ category are, on average, also non-informative. Note that there is more information
on the left tail of the status distribution: many of our top powerful names are already close
to the average in terms of electability, but low-status names are genuinely less powerful. We
20Note that this measure combines the likelihood of joining a winning list with the likelihood of being
closer to the top of the list.
27will therefore feel more comfortable inferring low power status in 2007 to candidates with
names for which we calculate a relatively low electability in 2003.
We can also obtain information about the SES of candidates from their surnames. While
￿rst names arise from a conscious choice by parents, surnames are passed on for generations.
Therefore, their informational content is in￿uenced by inherited attributes, such as genes,
income, education,... (Guell, et al., 2007). Fortunately for our study, the two papers we
are aware of studying the informational content of surnames both focus on the case of
Spain. Collado, Ort￿n, and Romeu (2008) use yellow pages and other sources and ￿nd that
individuals with low-frequency surnames in Spain tend to be more likely to be doctors,
lawyers, and university professors. Individuals with rare surnames had also been more likely
to be literate in the 1890 historical Census. With respect to political power, these authors
also ￿nd low-frequency surnames to be over-represented amongst political candidates in the
2004 national congress and Senate elections, but this e￿ect is solely driven by the conservative
and nationalist parties.21 Similarly Guell et al. (2007) use con￿dential Census data and ￿nd
that ￿the more frequent a surname is, the less education should you expect her holder to
have achieved.￿
People in Spain use two surnames: ￿rst the father’s ￿rst surname, and then the mother’s
￿rst surname. A traditional way to achieve high-status surname di￿erentiation in Spain has
been to hyphenate two surnames (e.g. Garcia-Parra) and then use another one from the
parents as a second surname (see Salazar-Acha, 1991). Similar strategies have historically
implied using prepositions to compound a surname with another one or a geographic location
(e.g. Sanchez de la Ensenada). Such ￿double-barreled￿ surnames tend to be carried by
individuals of measurably high socioeconomic status (Collado et al., 2008).
The insights above allow us to infer higher likelihood of a better education and SES in
the following ways: i) we create a dummy that takes value one if the candidate is female
and her ￿rst name power-status (relative electability in 2003) is below 0.9, corresponding to
the lowest quartile in the name distribution22; ii) we create a dummy that equals one if the
candidate is female and has a rare ￿rst surname; rare surnames are such that the number of
female candidates bearing that surname was less than or equal to 5 (out of 70,556) in 2003
(this corresponds to the lowest quartile of the female distribution by surname frequency);
iii) we create a dummy equal to 1 for women with a ￿rst surname in the list of the top
17 surnames encompassing 25 percent of the total candidate population in 2003. 23 Those
21Note that most recent immigrants that arrived after 2002 were largely ineligible to vote or join a list in
the 2003, 2004, and 2007 elections. Prior to that period, immigration levels in the country were very low.
22Results are not sensitive to changing this threshold or on focusing on the right-tail of the status distri-
bution.
23For both measures ii) and iii) we ￿nd no additional value￿in terms of predicting electability￿in adding
28extremely common surnames (e.g. Gonzalez, Garcia) can be seen in Table 9, panel A, column
3; iv) we create a dummy that takes value one if the candidate is a female and her surname
is longer than the conventional 3 words. To calculate the number of words we separate
hyphenated surnames into two words and count as words the usual connecting prepositions
(e.g. ￿de￿, ￿la￿).
Remarkably, we ￿nd the surname strategies to be successful in replicating the patterns
suggested by the previous literature. Focusing on the likelihood of each female candidate
resulting elected in 2003 (about 20 percent on average), we ￿nd that women with low-
frequency surnames were 1.5 percentage points more likely to be elected than the median,
and that women with the very common surnames were less electable in the same proportion.
Individuals with names longer than the conventional 3 words were 2 percentage points more
likely to be elected, a remarkable 10 percent increase in such probability. These are, in our
view, large e￿ects. Reassuringly, surname rarity, not bearing one of the common surnames,
and name length all increase signi￿cantly the likelihood of bearing a high-status ￿rst name,
which further validates the informational content of these alternative measures. 24
In Table 9, panel B, we look at whether the Equality-Law quota increased the educational
and social status of the women candidates in treated municipalities as captured by the
name measures. To do so, we present models of the 2003 and 2007 elections where each
candidate represents an observation, and include municipal ￿xed e￿ects to control for local
unobservables. On the left-hand side, the female status measures take value zero for all males,
and one or zero for females depending on whether they bear a high or low-status name. The
main controls on the right-hand-side are: a baseline dummy for female candidates, a dummy
for female candidates in municipalities a￿ected by the law, a dummy for female candidates
in 2007, and a dummy for female candidates in municipalities a￿ected by the law in 2007.
The coe￿cient of interest is the latter one. Note that the fully-interacted model allows us
to interpret the coe￿cient of the female dummy as the baseline probability of women to be
in a low or high-status group, and to benchmark the other coe￿cients accordingly. In order
to give the ￿endogenous quality￿ hypothesis a better chance we present separate regressions
for the top 5 positions and the rest. Presumably, high-quality women speci￿cally attracted
by the power quotas would want to go at the top of the lists. 25
The results in Panel B of Table 9 do not display any evidence of an increase in the
socioeconomic status of females in the quota municipalities after the law. 26 Note that we
the informational content of the second surname.
24The interested reader can consult appendix table 3 for these results.
25When we pool both samples, the results are similar both quantitatively and in terms of statistical
signi￿cance.
26We also repeated the same analysis for the non-competitive municipalities, where the e￿ect of the quotas
29have a large amount of observations and are, therefore, likely to pick up relatively small but
systematic e￿ects (in fact, the regressions do capture small temporal trends in some of the
variables). If anything, the results tend to indicate that lower-status females were more likely
to be included in the top 5 positions after the quotas (lower status names, less rare and more
common surnames, and shorter names), but the individual coe￿cients are not statistically
signi￿cant. We conclude that it is unlikely that the quotas resulted in marked increases in
the quality of the female candidates in the ￿eld.
7 Conclusion
Recent research has emphasized the existence of di￿erences in tastes and psyches between
genders (Crosson and Gneezy, 2008). Lawless and Fox (2005) conducted a survey of potential
women candidates in the US and report that women tend to see themselves as less apt
political leaders on average. We argue that, while these issues are certainly important to
account for the outcomes experienced by the average female, they do not necessarily explain
why women are underrepresented in positions of power. Insofar there is demand for it in
electoral markets, and party machines try to maximize votes in a competitive environment
electoral lists should include a large fraction of women candidates, easily drawn from the
very right tail of the female ability and ambition joint distribution. It is not possible to
understand female under-representation in the relatively-few top positions independently
from the market demand for talented female politicians and the behavior of party machines
on the supply-side (Becker, 1957).
To frame this debate, we developed a model that nests most of the explanations of
why women are underrepresented in powerful positions. Some factors that account for this
problem may be mediated by markets. On the demand side, customers in the political
process (voters) may prefer male candidates. On the supply side, there may be less willing
quali￿ed female candidates. Alternatively, the factors that determine the low availability of
female candidates may stem from internal processes within the political parties.
We then took the predictions of the di￿erent hypotheses to the data. We used Spain’s
Equality Law as a natural experiment providing an exogenous increase in female political
participation. The timing of the passage of the Inequality Law in 2007, establishing a 40
percent quota of women in all electoral lists, was exogenous and quite unpredictable. The
Equality Law was passed in March 2007, just two months before the municipal elections.
An important feature of the Equality Law, was that it only applied in 2007 to munici-
is most pronounced. We do not ￿nd any evidence of an increase in the SES of female candidates in those
municipalities either.
30palities with populations above 5000 inhabitants. We therefore implemented a discontinuity
design that compared treated and control municipalities around that threshold before and
after the law’s passage.
Empirically, we found that the law increased the female candidate share by eight per-
centage points, representing an increase of 25 percent in the number of women candidates.
Such large shock to the number of local female politicians did not have any adverse impact
on voter turnout or protest ballots in the treated municipalities. We also found that parties
did not have major problems ￿nding suitable female candidates to ￿ll in the quota. The
female quota was not associated with increased list attrition or di￿culties for new lists to
arise. Parties did not need to retain past women candidates more often or to promote female
￿￿ller￿ candidates to top positions. This evidence is not consistent with the existence of
major supply constraints of female candidates.
In addition, parties that were further from the 40 percent female threshold and were
therefore forced to ￿eld in more female candidates experienced increases in their vote shares.
The evidence is not consistent either with the existence of generalized strong preferences for
male candidates amongst voters.
We further found that the positive e￿ect of women on votes was concentrated in munic-
ipalities with non-competitive elections, where one party had enjoyed an absolute majority
in the 2003 elections. In these municipalities, the incumbent lists had ￿elded a number of
women that was signi￿cantly below the average in competitive elections. More men had
been ￿elded in elections were the incumbent party had a large number of safe seats, but
these parties subsequently fared better with more women in the next elections. All of these
facts are at odds with the claim that more men are required to win elections.
Were parties and female potential candidates locked in a bad Nash equilibrium, with good
woman candidates not showing up for lack of prospects and parties o￿ering low positions
to females due to lack of quali￿cations? We showed that further results are not consistent
with this hypothesis. The quotas - forcing parties to o￿er some of the top positions to
women- were unlikely to have attracted women of higher educational or socioeconomic status.
Names and surnames convey SES and educational status in Spain; however there was no
di￿erential growth in the status of names or surnames of the female candidates in the treated
municipalities.
The explanation for lower female representation seems to revolve around the internal
dynamics of candidate choices within the parties: parties behave as if they displayed dis-
criminatory tastes. Are women themselves opting for less powerful positions? While women
may shy from competition on average, a large number of women in competitive lists lever-
aged the Equality Law to attain higher positions than the minimum ones guaranteed by the
31quota. However, female candidates had more di￿culty attaining top positions in relatively
￿safe￿ top spots in incumbent lists. The evidence seems overall more consistent with the
existence of entrenched male-dominated political machines, especially in less competitive
environments.
The results demonstrate that forcing parties to accept more women through quotas on the
candidate lists can increase female participation without necessarily decreasing the electabil-
ity of the candidates. But at the same time, competition may also limit the scope for
discrimination from party machines. Hence, alternative policy responses could imply more
reliance on party primaries at all levels, open lists, voting for candidates rather than lists,
and more competitive electoral environments with less ￿safe￿ seats at the disposition of party
machines. We hypothesize that such measures could also induce more females to participate
in the political process, without having to impose strict quotas, a testable hypothesis for
future research on this topic. In fact women representation is much larger in proportional
electoral systems (Norris, 2006, Norris and Krook, 2011) where each vote counts, as opposed
to majoritarian systems where many seats are de-facto owned and non-competitively allo-
cated by the machines of the locally dominant party, especially after redistricting. E￿ecting
the behavior of political machines vis-a-vis gender issues and understanding how compe-
tition changes these dynamics could thus be the keys to improve female chances at equal
participation.
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36Appendix A: Proofs
Throughout this section, we denote the variables that are chosen under the quota with the
superscript q. We use  to denote the change in a variable after the introduction of the
quota.
Proof of proposition 1. Because fpm = fpw, we can write f  fw = fm and ap  apw = apm.
Let F be the corresponding distribution function.
Each party chooses the best candidates for each gender. As a result, there is a one-to-one







f (a   ap)da =
 1
apw ap





Because lists are of a ￿xed size, there is also a one to one relationship between apw and apm,








= 0. As a result, if W0 < W1,
we must have a0w   a0 > a1w   a1 and a0m   a0 < a1m   a1 (when turnout is 100%, it also
follows that d0 > d1). Moreover, under the quota, aq
pw is chosen to satisfy W q
p = W because
the quota is binding for both parties. As both parties have the same share of women after
the quota is imposed, we have that a
q
0w   a0 = a
q
1w   a1 and a
q
0m   a0 = a
q
1m   a1. Finally,
notice that, because W1  1
2 < 1   W0, we have that a1w   a1 > a0m   a0.
We show next that for all voters x 2 [0;1], u(x;0) increases more than u(x;1) after
the introduction of the female quota, i.e. u(x;0)  u(x;1). To see this, notice that












Notice that because apw  aq
pw  aq
pm  apm, Ap  0 and therefore so is u(x;p).





























> A1 + (a0w   a0)[F (a0w   a0)   F (a1w   a1)]   (a0m   a0)[F (a1m   a1)   F (a0m   a0)]
 A1;
where the last inequality follows from the fact that F (a0w   a0) F (a1w   a1) = F (a1m   a1) 
37F (a0m   a0)  0.
Since the utility from voting either party increases, turnout cannot decrease. Indeed, if
turnout is less than 100% without the quota, it must increase after the quota is introduced.
We also need to see that V0 > V1. If there is full participation without the quota,
then V0 = 1   V1. The marginal voter, located at x = V0 is indi￿erent between the two
parties when no quota is present. However, because u(x;0) > u(x;1)  0, this voter
must strictly prefer to vote for party 0 when the quota is introduced. As a result, the quota
moves the marginal voter closer to party 1, so that V0 > 0 > V1.
When there is a partial turnout in the absence of any quota we have V0+V1 < 1. Suppose
that for each voter we increase the utility u(x;p) of voting each party p by . Then, as long
as x0 + x1 + 4
t  1, the number of votes of each party increases by exactly 2=t because
transportation costs are linear and voters are uniformly distributed on the line. 27 If quotas do
not lead to full participation, then Vp = 2Ap=t. It follows immediately that V0 > V1.
Instead, if quotas result in full participation, we can increase the utility from voting each




4 (1   V0   V1)
	
. In the second




4 (1   V0   V1)
	
.
This way, we have that 1
p +2
p = Ap, which is the full increase caused by the female quota.




V0 and V1 increase both by the same amount. The increase in utility in the second step is
larger for party 0 than for party 1. Moreover, either there is full participation after the ￿rst
step (if A1  t
4 (1   V0   V1)) or the utility of voting for party 1 does not increase in the
second step (if A1 < t
4 (1   V0   V1)). In either case, V0 increases by more than V1 in this
second step. Therefore, adding the e￿ects of the two steps, we get that V0 > V1.















apw   dv (xp)   ap

= 0, since parties set apw  apm = dv (xp). Therefore, it is easy to see
that apw   ap is increasing in dv (xp). As a result, the number of women Wp is a decreasing
function of dv (xp).
If turnout is 100%, the marginal voter is the same for both parties. As a result, both
parties set the same di￿erence for the standards of men and women, as apw apm = dv (xp) =
dv (x). Because the distribution of ability for men and women is the same, this means that
both parties must be choosing the same number of women. Therefore, if W0 < W1 it must
27Notice that the voter located in x0 is indi￿erent between voting party 0 and abstaining before the
increase in utility. If the utility of every voter increases by , then the voter that is indi￿erent between
voting party 0 and abstaining is now locacted in x0 +2=t, as u(x0 + 2=t;0)+ = u(x0;0) = u. Similarly,
the voter located in x1 2=t is indi￿erent between voting party 1 and abstaining after the increase in utility.
Moreover, because V0 + V1 + 4
t  1, these voters (weakly) prefers to vote for parties 0 and 1, respectively,
than voting for the other party. Therefore, such a change in utility increases both parties votes by 2=t.
38be because some voters abstain, and the marginal voters of the two parties di￿er. Moreover,
it must also be the case that dv (x0) > dv (x1). Because dv is monotonic, it must therefore
be decreasing.
We show next that, for all voters x 2 [0;1], u(x;0) decreases more than u(x;1) after
the introduction of the female quota, i.e. u(x;0)  u(x;1). To see this, notice that
u(x;p) = Ap   dv (x)  Wp. The change in utility u(x;p) is decreasing in dv (x).
As dv (x) is decreasing in x, it follows that u(x;0) < u(x0;0) for all x < x0, and
u(x;1) > u(x1;1) for all x > x1.












aw f (a)da, where
1   F (aw)   F (am) = 1   F (aq
w)   F (aq
m) = 0, 1   F (aq
w) = W, and aw   am = dv. It is
easy to see that 	(dv (xp)) = u(xp;p). This means that 	(dv (xp)) measures the change
in utility of party p’s marginal voter after the introduction of quotas. If we di￿erentiate with





























[f (aw) + f (am)]
@aw





@dv = dvf (aw)
@aw
@dv . Finally, notice that @	
@dv < 0 whenever aw < aq
w (as is the case
for any dv 2 [dv (x1);dv (x0)]).
Since 	 is a decreasing function of dv, and dv (x0) > dv (x1), it immediately follows that
u(x0;0) < u(x1;1) < 0. Moreover, because u(x;0) < u(x0;0) for all x < x0, and
u(x;1) > u(x1;1) for all x > x1, we must have V0 < V1 < 0.
Proof of proposition 3. Notice that W0 < W1 < 1
2 implies that F0w (a0w) > F1w (a1w) and
F0m (a0w) < F1m (a1w). By the assumption that Fpg (a) = Fg (a   apg), it follows that a0w  
a0w > a1w   a1w and a0m   a0m < a1m   a1m. Moreover, because dv = d0 = d1 = 0, parties
do not discriminate against women in the absence of quotas , and they both set apw = apm.
It also follows that u(x;p) = Ap.
The marginal man and woman of a given party have the same ability. The introduction of
the quota therefore forces parties to set aq
pw < aq
pm. Moreover, since both parties end up with
the same number of women under the quotas, it must be the case that a
q
0g  a0g = a
q
1g  a1g


















Notice that because aq
pw < apw = apm < aq
pm, Ap < 0 and therefore so is u(x;p).
































afw (a   a0w)da  
 a1m a1m+a0m
a0m
afm (a   a0m)da
 A1 + a0w [Fw (a0w   a0w)   Fw (a1w   a1w)]   a0m [Fm (a1m   a1m)   Fm (a0m   a0m)]
= A1;
where the inequality follows from the fact that Fw (a0w   a0w) Fw (a1w   a1w) = Fm (a1m   a1m) 
Fm (a0m   a0m).
Since the utility from voting either party decreases, turnout cannot increase. Indeed, if
turnout is less than 100% without quotas, it must decrease after the quotas are introduced.
Denote by V q
p and Vp the number of voters voting for party p with and without quotas,
respectively. We also need to see that V0 < V1. If there is full participation with
quotas, then there is also full participation without quotas. The marginal voter, located at
x = x0 is indi￿erent between the two parties when no quota is present. However, because
u(x;0) < u(x;1), this voter must strictly prefer to vote for party 1 when quotas are
introduced. As a result, V0 < 0 < V1.




1 < 1. If the absence of
quotas does not lead to full participation either, then Vp = 2Ap=t, because transportation
costs are linear and voters are uniformly distributed on the line. It is immediate that
V0 < V1. Instead, if the absence of quotas result in full participation, we can decrease
the utility from voting each party in two steps. First, decrease the utility of voting party p
for voter x by adding 1
p = maxfA0;u   u(x0;0)g to u(x;p). (Notice that the marginal
voter x0 is indi￿erent between voting either of the two parties, and therefore, u u(x0;0) =
u   u(x0;1).) In the second step we decrease the utility u(x;p) by adding 2
p = Ap  
maxfA0;u   u(x0;0)g. Notice that after the two steps the utility of voting for party p
decrease by Ap (the full decrease caused by the female quota). The decrease in the ￿rst
40step is common to both parties. Moreover, it still leads to full participation, as all voters still
prefer to vote for one of the two parties rather than abstaining. As a result, since the utility
of the marginal voter from voting each of the parties drops by the same amount, this voter
is still indi￿erent between them. Hence, V0 and V1 remain unchanged. The drop in utility in
the second step is larger for party 0 than for party 1. Moreover, either the utility of voting
for party 1 does not decrease in the second step (if A1  u   u(x0;0)), or the marginal
voter x0 is indi￿erent between voting either party or abstaining (if A1 < u   u(x0;0)).
In either case, V0 decreases by more than V1 in this second step (notice that in the second
case Vp decreases by 22
p=t). Therefore, adding the e￿ects of the two steps, we get that
V0 < V1.
41Number of of Candidatures with N Women in 
2003 - Pre-Law (Rows) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total Percentage
0 8 10 13 14 12 5 0 1 0 63 0.00%
1 3 22 60 56 45 31 1 1 1 220 2.19%
2 3 25 93 154 135 77 26 2 0 515 7.64%
3 1 20 80 187 225 154 50 8 2 727 17.88%
4 2 4 34 111 224 234 77 17 0 703 25.23%
5 0 4 16 49 91 203 77 19 1 460 24.40%
6 0 2 2 15 40 51 44 7 1 162 15.97%
7 0 0 1 4 7 8 6 3 0 29 5.62%
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1.01%
More 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0.03%
Total 17 87 299 590 779 764 282 58 5 2,881
Percentage 0.59% 3.02% 10.38% 20.48% 27.04% 26.52% 9.79% 2.01% 0.17%
Number of of Candidatures with N Women in 
2003 - Pre-Law (Rows) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total Percentage
0 0 0 0 0 1 6 4 1 0 12 0.90%
1 0 0 0 0 2 8 25 1 0 36 2.70%
2 0 0 0 0 3 28 90 7 0 128 9.62%
3 0 0 0 1 2 54 180 21 1 259 19.46%
4 0 0 0 1 4 52 179 51 2 289 21.71%
5 1 0 0 0 1 40 194 63 4 303 22.76%
6 0 0 0 0 0 25 141 51 5 222 16.68%
7 0 0 0 0 0 2 32 23 0 57 4.28%
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 12 0 21 1.58%
More 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 4 0.30%
Total 0 0 0 2 13 215 858 230 12 1,331
Percentage 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.15% 0.98% 16.15% 64.46% 17.28% 0.90%
Quota's Impact: Number of Lists by Number of Women Candidates
TABLE 1
Number of Candidatures with N Women in 2007 - Post Law (Columns)
Number of Candidatures with N Women in 2007 - Post-Law (Columns)
Panel B: Treatment Group; Inequality Law Applies in 2007 (Population between 5,000 and 8,000)




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equality Law Binds x 2007 0.072 0.076 0.000 0.086 0.083 0.043
(0.015)*** (0.015)*** (0.017) (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)***
Year 2007 0.048 0.047 0.05
(0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Two-sided Population Polinomials in 
Distance to Discontinuity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
FE None Province Province Municipality Municipality Municipality
Years 2007 2007 2003 2003-2007 2003-2007 2003-2007
Observations (Municipality by Year) 1438 1438 1400 2874 2874 2874
Number of Municipalities 1438 1438 1400 1437 1437 1437
R-squared 0.33 0.41 0.24 0.52 0.37 0.23
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 2
Impact of Equality Law on Women's Political Activism
Share of Women in Municipal Lists
All Positions in ListNew List in 2007 
(yes=1, no=0)
Equality Law Dummy 0.010 0.021
(0.027) (0.031)
Max{0, Required Women in 2007 - Women in 2003 List } x 
Equality Law Dummy -0.006
(0.007)
Women in List 2003 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
Share of Vote in 2003 (columns 1 and 2) or 2007 (column 3) -0.174 -0.159 -0.229
(0.016)*** (0.022)*** (0.021)***
Party Fixed Effects yes yes yes
Municipal Fixed Effects no yes no
Two-sided Population Polinomials in Distance to Discontinuity yes no yes
Observations (Lists in 2003 - columns 1 and 2; Lists in 2007 - 
column 3) 5289 5289 5678
R-squared 0.71 0.78 0.69
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the municipal level)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
2003 List Missing in 2007 
(yes=1, no=0)
TABLE 3
Female Quotas Do not Impede Local List FormationShare of Candidates 
who are Women
Share of Candidates 
who are Women 
Appearing only in the 
2007 List
Share of Candidates 
who are Women
Share of Candidates 
who are Women 
Appearing only in the 
2007 List
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equality Law x 2007 0.082 0.084 0.08 0.065
(0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.011)*** (0.009)***
Two-sided Population Polinomials in 
Distance to Discontinuity yes yes yes yes
Municipal and Year Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes
Observations (All Individuals in all Lists 
and relevant municipality, by year) 125676 125676 54614 54614
Sample (Years) 2003 and 2007 2003 and 2007 2003 and 2007 2003 and 2007
Number of municipalities 1438 1438 1438 1438
R-squared 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
TABLE 4
All Candidates Only Candidates in Top 5 Positions
Female Quotas: Effects on Female Candidate Retention, Promotion, or New ArrivalsShare of Blank and Null 
Votes
OLS Town Fixed Effects + IV
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Share of Women Candidates  0.145 -0.008 -0.019 -0.024 -0.02
(0.024)*** (0.044) (0.031) (0.046) (0.028)
Year 2007 -0.035 -0.019 -0.018 -0.017 0.001








421                      
(Treated Only)
1,437
Municipality FE No Yes
Two-sided Population Polinomials in 
Distance to Discontinuity
Years
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
2003-2007




Impact of a Female 40% Quota on Measures of Voter Participation
Voter Participation Rate
Inequality Law Binding x 2007 x 
Distance to 40% Target in 2003(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Change in Number of Women in List (Instrumented) 0.007 0.01 0.024 0.01 0.009 0.016 0.004
(0.003)** (0.003)*** (0.013)* (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)
Number of Women in List in 2003 0.014
(0.010)
Share of Candidates Repeating from 2003 List -0.013 0.054
(0.012) (0.012)***
List Won 2003 Election -0.059
(0.004)***
Observations (Lists by Municipality in 2007) 1329 4191 4191 4191 4191 1491 2700
Number of municipalities 418 1408 1408 1408 1408 508 900
R-squared
Municipality Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Party Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes









Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
All regressions include municipality and National-Party fixed effects.  
All Treated and Control
TABLE 6
Effects of Female Quotas: Positive Impact of Women On Electoral Results
2007-2003 Change in Share of the Vote for Party
2000-8000
Party Vote Share in 2003
Max{ 0 , Required Women in 2007 - Women in 2003 List } x Equality Law DummyWomen's Share 
in 2003
(1) (2) (3)
Non-competitive Town in 2003 -0.062 -0.012 0.008
(0.060) (0.007)* (0.007)
Non-competitive Town x List Won the 2003 Election -0.033
(0.011)***
List won the 2003 Election -0.001
(0.006)





Observations (Lists in Municipalities in 2003)
Robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the municipality level)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
5281
Women's Share 2003: 
Top 5 Positions
TABLE 7
Electoral Competition and Share of Women:  Pre-Quota
Party Vote Share in 2003
2003
2000-8000
YesTop 5 Top 3 Mayor Top 5 Top 3 Mayor Top 5 Top 3 Mayor
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Equality Law x 2007 0.079 0.046 0.036 0.086 0.035 0.000 0.076 0.052 0.052
(0.007)*** (0.010)*** (0.017)** (0.012)*** (0.015)** (0.021) (0.009)*** (0.013)*** (0.023)**
2007 0.05 0.045 0.019 0.055 0.065 0.034 0.047 0.035 0.012
(0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.009)** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.012)
List Fixed Effects yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Two-sided Population Polinomials in 
Distance to Discontinuity yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 0.69 0.68 0.7 0.74 0.73 0.81 0.67 0.66 0.66
Observations (Lists Appearing in 2003 
and 2007 by Municipality and year)
Standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Share of Women in List by Position of Candidate:
TABLE 8
Women Leveraged Bargaining Power from Quota
8424 2654 5770













IZASKUN 2.20 TANIA 0.15 GARCIA 3.60%
IDOIA 2.13 LAIA 0.22 FERNANDEZ 2.27%
VIRTUDES 1.91 LETICIA 0.25 GONZALEZ 2.18%
MIREN 1.81 TAMARA 0.32 RODRIGUEZ 2.11%
ALFONSA 1.76 LORENA 0.34 SANCHEZ 1.98%
REYES 1.70 VANESSA 0.36 MARTINEZ 1.88%
MAITE 1.59 MACARENA 0.42 LOPEZ 1.87%
AMAIA 1.57 NOEMI 0.42 PEREZ 1.82%
AGUSTINA 1.56 ESTER 0.47 MARTIN 1.19%
AINHOA 1.53 ELISABET 0.47 GOMEZ 1.11%
MONTSE 1.53 GRACIA 0.47 HERNANDEZ 0.82%
TRINIDAD 1.46 MARCELINA 0.49 RUIZ 0.81%
CANDELARIA 1.42 CONSOLACION 0.49 JIMENEZ 0.76%
ESMERALDA 1.39 ELISABETH 0.50 DIAZ 0.74%
DULCE 1.37 VICTORIA 0.50 ALVAREZ 0.71%
CONCEPCIO 1.35 SABINA 0.51 MORENO 0.65%
BENITA 1.35 MIREIA 0.52 MUÑOZ 0.59%
MARGARIDA 1.35 SANDRA 0.52
EMMA 1.34 PATROCINIO 0.54 Total 25.08%
RITA 1.33 ALBA 0.55
Top 5 Below Top 5 Top 5 Below Top 5 Top 5 Below Top 5 Top 5 Below Top 5
Equality Law x 2007 x Woman 0.008 0.001 -0.010 -0.014 0.002 0.001 -0.009 0.003
(0.007) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007)** (0.008) (0.007) (0.016) (0.013)
Woman Candidate 0.161 0.193 0.247 0.244 0.247 0.254 0.164 0.145
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)***
Woman x 2007 0.019 0.014 0.028 0.041 0.002 -0.014 -0.012 -0.021
(0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004) (0.004)*** (0.009) (0.008)***
Equality Law x Woman 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.003 -0.015 -0.009 -0.014 -0.017
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)** (0.006) (0.013) (0.011)
Municipal FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations (Candidates) 54,614 71,062 54,614 71,062 54,614 71,062 54,614 71,062
Standard errors in parentheses (clustered at the municipal level)
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Quotas Did not Increase Presence of High-Status Names
TABLE 9
(1) (2) (3)
=1 if candidate has low-
status female first name
=1 if candidate is female and 
has rare surname
=1 if candidate is female 
and has common surname
=1 if candidate is female 
and has long name
Panel B: Impact of Quotas on High-Status Females
Panel A: Highest and Lowest Power-Status Female Names, and Common Surnames(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Equality Law Binds x 2007 0.089 0.084 0.083 0.086 0.087 0.081 0.086 0.088 0.09
(0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.013)***
Year 2007 0.043 0.047 0.049 0.048 0.05 0.055 0.051 0.049 0.042
(0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.009)***
Municipalities (Population Size) 0 to 10000 1000 to 9000 1500 to 8500 2000 to 8000 2500 to 7500 3000 to 7000 3500 to 6500 4000 to 6000 4500 to 5500
Observations 9460 4888 3658 2872 1885 1591 1135 762 376
Number of Municipalities 4742 2445 1830 1437 943 796 568 381 188
R-squared 0.23 0.41 0.47 0.52 0.54 0.61 0.64 0.65 0.7




Impact of Equality Law Female Participation: Banwidth robustness














(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Equality Law Binds  0.243 -65.406 76.693 -0.095 7.577 3.122 0.009 -1.978
(0.266) (91.956) (342.850) (0.376) (5.962) (8.939) (0.035) (6.002)
Observations 1402 1402 1402 1402 944 1402 944 944
R-squared 0.45 0.75 0.25 0.5 0.31 0.57 0.05 0.5




Standard errors in parentheses





No Other Discontinuities at Inequality Law Binding Population LevelLow Status Name
(1) (2) (3)
Low-Frequency Surname 0.006 0.014 -0.015
(0.004) (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Very Common Surname -0.01 -0.015 0.011
(0.004)** (0.004)*** (0.004)***
Long Name 0.027 0.025 -0.114
(0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)***
Constant 0.205 0.21 0.331
(0.003)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)***
Region FE No Yes Yes
Year 2003 2003 2003 and 2007^
Observations 70,556 70,556 98,941
R-squared 0 0.02 0.02
Robust standard errors in parentheses
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%




Low-Status Surname Predicts Low Power and Low-Status Name